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NOTES
CHALLENGING THE TAX SUMMONS:
PROCEDURES AND DEFENSES
The investigatory powers of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
include the authority to summon an individual, his records, or any
third party having custody of his records.' The taxpayer, in turn,
may resist disclosure of his records or other information by challeng-
ing the summons either on procedural or substantive grounds.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 has added significantly to the tax-
payer's protection against enforcement of a summons. 2 Thus, he
now is afforded the benefit of notice and the right to intervene under
most circumstances, as for example, if a third party in possession
of the taxpayer's records is ordered to relinquish them. Moreover,
particularly if the taxpayer challenges the propriety of the sum-
mons, he may obtain discovery of relevant agency material under
1. I.R.C. § 7601(a) provides that:
The Secretary shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or
employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through
each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons
therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owing
or having care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is
imposed.
I.R.C. § 7602 provides that:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any
internal revenue tax. . . or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is author-
ized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for the tax or required to perform the act,
or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession,
custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business
of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person
the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and
place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or
other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or
material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975).
2. Specifically, § 1205 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520
(1976), requires that certain procedures be followed in issuing summonses to third-party
record holders.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA)2 Finally, the taxpayer may assert substantive de-
fenses to enforcement of the summons, including noncompliance by
the IRS with the investigative prerequisites, infringement of privi-
leged attorney-client communications, and violation of the tax-
payer's constitutional right to privacy.'
This Note will canvass the processes of summons issuance and
enforcement and discuss the procedures for resistance available to
the taxpayer. In particular, it will examine the discovery procedures
available to a summonee under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the FOIA, as well as the substantive defenses assertible against
summons enforcement. The protection guaranteed by the fourth
and fifth amendments will be evaluated in an attempt to reconcile
the interest of the government in devising a fair and expeditious
system for enforcing the revenue laws and that of the individual in
protecting the privacy of his records.
PROCEDURES FOR TAXPAYER RESISTANCE OF THE TAX SUMMONS
Background: Summons Resistance Prior to the 1976 Tax Reform
Act
A taxpayer under IRS investigation must be served with a sum-
mons at least ten days prior to the date of examination.5 Once
served, he must appear before a hearing officer at the time and place
designated in the summons, subject to a fine of up to $1000, a year
in jail, or both for noncompliance.' The taxpayer, however, may
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). For the text of that provision, see note 40 infra.
4. The fundamental conflict between the government's interest in enforcing revenue laws
and the individual's right to privacy inheres in IRS investigations. Often, the information
sought by the IRS was disclosed to third parties with the understanding that it would remain
confidential, and, thus, IRS summonses threaten the very foundation of this relationship. For
example, the predicament of the bank depositor was articulated by the court in Burrows v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974): "[A bank] depositor
reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits and associations. Indeed, the
totality of bank records provides a virtual current biography. . . . [These are included in]
papers which the customer has supplied to the bank . . . upon the reasonable assumption
that the information would remain confidential." Id. at 248, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr.
at 172.
5. I.R.C. § 7605(a). Service of the summons is made through Commissioner-designated IRS
personnel who either hand deliver an attested copy of the summons to the summonee or leave
it at the taxpayer's last and usual place of abode. I.R.C. § 7603.
6. I.R.C. § 7210. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 259 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1958). These
sanctions are applicable only if the summonee either wholly defaults or contumaciously
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appear and still interpose a good faith refusal to comply.7
Confronted with a taxpayer's refusal to comply, the IRS may seek
judicial enforcement of the summons in the district court for the
district in which the taxpayer resides or can be found.8 Although the
enforcement hearings are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,9 in practice, the district courts have considerable discre-
tion regarding the Rules' application;"0 therefore, some pretrial
procedures used routinely in civil litigation may be unavailable to
a summonee. 1' Also, although in the adversary enforcement pro-
refuses to comply and cannot be imposed if a good faith defense is interposed. Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1974). Even assuming that without good reason the taxpayer disobeys,
the hearing officer does not have the power to enforce the summons. Id.
7. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 447 (1974); cf. FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304
U.S. 375, 386-87 (1938) (equating summonee's neglect with willful noncompliance).
If the summons is issued directly to the taxpayer rather than to the third-party record
holder, the former may force the IRS to institute enforcement proceedings merely by refusing
to comply. See, e.g., Callahan v. First Pa. Bank, 422 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Should
the summons be issued to the third-party record holder, however, the taxpayer must inter-
vene to prevent compliance by the third party. See generally Warden, Rules ForAdministra-
tive Summonses Completely Revamped Under 1976 Act, 46 J. TAX. 32 (1977).
8. I.R.C. §§ 7604(a), 7402(b) provide that:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify,
or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district
court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdic-
tion by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or produc-
tion of books, papers, records, or other data.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part:
[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] . . . apply to proceedings to compel the
giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena
issued by an officer or agency of the United States under any statute of the
United States except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district
court or by order of the court in the proceedings.
Id. (emphasis supplied). See also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528 (1971);
United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 372-73 (3d Cir. 1975).
10. Regarding the procedure to be followed in bringing an enforcement action, the Supreme
Court stated that the "proceedings are instituted by filing a complaint, followed by an answer
and a hearing." United States v. Powell, 397 U.S. 48, 58 n.18 (1964). The courts have con-
strued procedural requirements loosely, however, upholding proceedings instituted by the
mere filing of a petition followed by an order to show cause. See, e.g., United States v.
McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gajewski, 419 F.2d
1088 (8th Cir. 1969); McGarry's, Inc. v. Rose, 344 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1965); United States v.
Zimmerman, 415 F. Supp. 1380 (W.D. Tex. 1976). In Newman the court approved this
abbreviated procedure, calling it an "effective and appropriate procedural tool. Indeed, it
harmonizes procedure with the substantive principle that puts the burden on the summoned
party. . . ." 441 F.2d at 169.
11. United States v. Ruggerio, 300 F. Supp. 968, 972 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affl'd, 425 F.2d 1069
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Kyriaco v. United States, 401 U.S. 922 (1971). Under
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ceedings 2 the taxpayer may protest the agency's action before the
court, 13 the IRS, nevertheless, is still in the more advantageous posi-
tion; it need not show probable cause for the issuance of a sum-
mons,4 and the taxpayer has the burden of proving the noncompli-
ance with formal summons requirements.', Moreover, until passage
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, only under limited circumstances
could a taxpayer object to the compelled disclosure of records held
by third parties such as banks, accountants, and attorneys.
Even under the new Act, the summonee may not initiate an ac-
tion to challenge the summons but must await the enforcement
hearing, if sought by the IRS. 6 Unable to enjoin enforcement, 7 the
Rule 81(a)(3), which specifies that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable
"except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the
court in the proceedings", the district court has considerable discretion in applying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in enforcement hearings. United States v. Church of Scien-
tology, 520 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1975). See also note 24 infra.
12. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1974); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,
524, 526 (1971). In Reisman Justice Clark wrote that "[a]ny enforcement action under...
[section 7604(a) of the Internal Revenue Code] would be an adversary proceeding affording
a judicial determination of the challenges to the summons and giving complete protection to
the witness." 375 U.S. at 446.
13. The taxpayer contesting enforcement, however, has no right to a jury trial. United
States v. Brooks, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9327 (D.S.C. 1976); Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F.
Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
14. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964).
15. See United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971).
16. See notes 17-18 infra.
17. Kelley v. United States, 503 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974); Farnham v. Schwab, 76-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9547 (S.D. Tex. 1976). The courts disagree as to the grounds for denying
injunctive or declaratory relief in a pre-enforcement hearing. In Farnham v. Schwab, supra,
the court denied injunctive relief because the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. I.R.C. § 7421 expressly prohibits the courts from entertaining a suit "for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax," which includes actions to
enjoin enforcement of a § 7602 summons. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (as amended 1976) specifically
precludes declaratory relief in cases involving federal taxes. Accord, United States v. Dema,
544 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1976).
Other courts have disagreed with the decision in Farnham, holding that I.R.C. § 7421 does
not preclude courts from entertaining suits to enjoin § 7602 summons, in that such suits do
not have as their purpose the restraint of assessment or collection. See Bowser v. First Nat'l
Bank, 390 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1975); Cook v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Nev.
1974); Kirschenbaum v. Beerman, 376 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Hoopes v. IRS, 33
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 74-1233 (D. Utah 1973). Some courts have entertained suits for injunctive
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1970), granting federal district courts jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any act of Congress that provides for internal revenue, although usually
such relief is denied on the merits. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 1103 (D.
Nev. 1974). Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (as amended 1976) bars declaratory relief in such a
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taxpayer also is precluded from bringing a damages action' 8 or a
proceeding against the judge or official ordering enforcement.'" Not-
withstanding the clear potential for abuse of the summons proce-
dure, the courts have denied taxpayers injunctive relief agaiist har-
assment by IRS agents.20 Thus, unscrupulous agents could issue a
series of summonses without seeking enforcement but forcing the
taxpayer to appear at repeated hearing examinations or risk severe
penalties for nonappearance. 2' This harassment ultimately could
coerce the taxpayer either to disclose his records, despite the exist-
ence of a bona fide defense, or to settle a collateral dispute prema-
turely. Awarding injunctive relief in such situations would be not
only equitable but also consistent with Congress' expressed inten-
tion to curb abuse of the summons power.22
Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Although the taxpayer's substantive defense to compliance with
an IRS summons may be grounded on misconduct or harassment by
the issuing agents,rs his ability to substantiate these allegations dur-
ing enforcement hearings may be impaired by the courts' exercise
of their discretionary authority. In the interest of expeditious sum-
mons enforcement, the district courts may suspend or restrict the
discovery procedures sanctioned by the Federal Rules. 24 Further-
case currently is unclear. Compare Calvin v. Alexander, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 75-5946 (N.D.
Ind. 1975) with Hoopes v. IRS, 33 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 74-1233 (D. Utah 1973).
18. Farnham v. Schwab, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9547 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
19. United States v. Zimmerman, 415 F. Supp. 1380 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
20. See United States v. Dema, 544 F.2d 1373 (7th Cir. 1976) (Markey, J. dissenting);
Dickerson v. Conrad, 274 F. Supp. 881 (D. Alas. 1967) (no relief prior to summons). Whether
injunctive relief is available to prevent harassment by the issuance of repeated summonses
if enforcement has been denied once is unclear. In such a case, the doctrine of res judicata is
no bar to a second summons. United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974).
21. See note 6 supra & accompanying text.
22. I.R.C. § 7605(b), in an attempt to limit harassment, requires a revenue agent to obtain
authorization from his superior prior to issuing a summons for a second examination of the
taxpayer's records. See notes 138, 139 infra.
23. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
24. Rule 81(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the district court substan-
tial discretion to suspend or limit discovery in the interest of expeditious summons enforce-
ment proceedings. See United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 1973); accord,
United States v. Wright Motor Co., 536 F.2d 1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40,
42 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bowman, 435 F.2d 467, 469 (3d Cir. 1970); United States
v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1970); cf. Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F. Supp. 190 (N.D.
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more, to even obtain pretrial discovery, the taxpayer must go be-
yond merely alleging improper purposes25 and demonstrate specific
evidence of IRS misconduct in the summons issuance.2 1 In explain-
ing the rationale for placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer
prior to permitting discovery, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit stated:
A broad discovery order puts the Internal Revenue Service under
a severe handicap in conducting a civil investigation. Broad dis-
covery can be expected to cause extensive delays and to jeopard-
ize the integrity and effectiveness of the entire investigation.
Coupled with these considerations is the fact that taxpayers have
been almost uniformly unsuccessful in proving an "improper pur-
pose" defense.Y
Although the United States Courts of Appeals agree that discov-
ery prior to an enforcement hearing should be denied unless the
taxpayer sustains his burden of proof, disagreement exists regarding
the necessary degree of proof. In weighing the taxpayer's need to
substantiate a claim of IRS misconduct against the government's
desire to expedite tax collection,28 the Fifth Circuit concluded in
United States v. Roundtree 9 that discovery should be permitted
when "the IRS's purpose. . . has been put in issue and may affect
the legality of the summons . . . .The district court has authority
Ill. 1966) (ordering discovery without discussing court's prerogative to exercise discretion).
For the text of Rule 81(a)(3), see note 9 supra.
25. United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975) (discovery
denied when mere allegation of pressure to settle collateral dispute); United States v. Na-
tional State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972) (possibility of obtaining evidence of
criminal acts through use of civil summons not evidence of bad faith); United States v. Salter,
432 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1970) (discovery granted if, after questioning agent, a substantial
question exists regarding the legitimacy of the government's purpose).
26. Under the rule in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the government may be
required by due process to provide the defense with any information that may affect the
credibility of the government's evidence, Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
or that may be of "effective use" to the defendant. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1967).
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (as amended 1974), also may assist the
defendant in securing records. However, the exceptions to the Act, together with the expense
and delay inherent in a collateral suit should the IRS resist disclosure, limit the effectiveness
of this tool. See Bray, Production of Documents and Seizure of Evidence, 32 N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAx. 1223, 1244-47, 1249-50 (1974).
27. United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1970).
28. United States v. Wright Motor Co., 536 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1976).
29. 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969).
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to curtail the deposition if it is conducted unreasonably. 3M
The Courts of Appeals for the First and Third Circuits permit
limited discovery at the outset of an enforcement hearing.3' Adopt-
ing a procedure suggested by the IRS, the First Circuit in United
States v. Salter 2 stated that the district court should allow the
taxpayer to cross-examine at the hearing the agent who issued the
challenged summons. By observing the agent as he testifies, the
court is better able to determine whether further discovery is neces-
sary.33 The Ninth Circuit also has endorsed this procedure, although
that court suggested an alternative method whereby the taxpayer
could obtain a separate pretrial hearing on the issue of discovery. 4
Apparently extending its former position, 5 the Fifth Circuit re-
cently proposed the most liberal of the discovery standards, permit-
ting a summoned taxpayer to depose the issuing agent upon only an
allegation of a substantial deficiency in the summons procedures.3 6
In contrast to the First Circuit, which requires the taxpayer to pres-
ent evidence of IRS impropriety," the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Wright Motor Co.3" stated that a taxpayer who merely alleges that
the IRS has summoned him for an improper purpose should be
entitled to investigate that purpose through deposition of the
agent..39
30. Id. at 852 (footnote and citations omitted). See United States v. Church of Scientology,
520 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1975).
31. The procedures adopted by the First and Third Circuits are similar. Compare United
States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975) with United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697
(1st Cir. 1970).
32. 432 F.2d 697 (lst Cir. 1970).
33. Id. at 700. Several courts have denied discovery if the summonee had the opportunity
to cross-examine the summoning agent at the enforcement hearing. See, e.g., United States
v. Interstate Tool and Eng'r Corp., 526 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. National
State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 42 (9th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Bowman, 435 F.2d 467, 469 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Rosinsky, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 76-678,76-679 (M.D.N.C. 1976). In contrast, at least one court
has permitted limited discovery after the IRS stymied the summonee's efforts to prepare an
adequate defense by calling only a single revenue agent to testify, thus subverting a principal
function of the enforcement hearing. United States v. Lomar Discount Ltd., 61 F.R.D 420,
423 (N.D. fl1. 1973).
34. United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1975).
35. As articulated in United States v. Roundtree, 536 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1969), the Fifth
Circuit permitted discovery if the IRS's purpose in issuing the summons had been contested.
See notes 29 & 30 supra and accompanying text.
36. United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1971).
37. United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1970).
38. 536 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1976).
39. Id. at 1094.
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Because the enforcement of a summons may implicate the tax-
payer's fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and
seizures, the Fifth Circuit's approach is a proper application of its
discretionary authority over the discovery process. Although the
IRS need not show probable cause to gain enforcement of its sum-
mons, 39-' certain minimum procedural and substantive require-
ments should be met if the search and seizure is to be reasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In recognition of this
constitutional dimension to judicial enforcement of an allegedly
unlawful summons, the courts should afford the taxpayer a reasona-
ble opportunity not only to demonstrate any impropriety but to
discover whether such illegal conduct has occurred. The possible
delay and inconvenience to the IRS does not outweigh the tax-
payer's right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Therefore, if the propriety of the summons has been challenged,
liberal discovery subject to close judicial scrutiny should be permit-
ted.
Discovery under the Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)40 was not intended for
use as a discovery tool;4' the summoned taxpayer, however, may
invoke its provisions to obtain relevant agency materials to substan-
tiate his claim of impropriety. Requiring governmental agencies to
The Sixth Circuit has held that if the taxpayer has established the need for pretrial discov-
ery and has obtained an order, the discovery process cannot be terminated without a hearing.
United States v. Kessler, 474 F.2d 995 (6th Cir. 1973). At least one court has required that
the defendant either forego discovery or disclose to the government all documents, reports,
and objects he intends to produce at the enforcement hearing. United States v. Whiteside,
391 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Del. 1975).
39.1. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) provides in part that "each agency, upon any request for
records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall
make the records promptly available to any person." See generally Bray, Production of
Documents and Seizure of Evidence, 32 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1223 (1974).
41. United States v. Whiteside, 391 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Del. 1975). The FOIA is not intended
to benefit private litigants beyond the right of access to public records common to the general
public. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 23 (1974). Moreover, if
the taxpayer is being investigated for criminal activity, the FOIA may exempt the informa-
tion being sought. See, e.g., New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st
Cir. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976); Title Guarantee
Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976); Electri-flex Co. v. IRS, 412 F. Supp. 698, 702 (N.D.
Ill. 1976); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591 (D. Del. 1972).
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disclose certain documents to private citizens upon request or to
publish those documents in the Federal Register, the FOIA was
designed to subject agency action to public scrutiny" and to provide
public access to some governmental records. 3 If an agency fails
to comply with a request for information, suit may be brought to
compel disclosure," with the burden on the agency to justify its
refusal."
A litigant need not exhaust other discovery mechanisms to obtain
agency disclosure under the FOIA,46 but the FOIA in no way en-
larges the class of materials discoverable under the civil and crimi-
nal rules of procedure." Although a suit to compel agency disclosure
has priority on the docket, 7 .1 courts have refused to stay pending
civil or criminal litigation in which the requested information is to
be used.47 -2 Moreover, certain exceptions" to the disclosure require-
ment limit the Act's effectiveness as a tool for discovery in tax
summons cases.49 Exemption five, for example, permits the agency
to withhold inter- or intra-agency memoranda that normally would
be privileged in a civil discovery context." Similarly, exemption
42. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
43. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
44. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
45. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kanter v. IRS, 433 F. Supp. 812 (N.D.
Ill. 1977).
46. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972).
47. United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1977) (criminal proceeding); New
England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (lst Cir. 1976) (civil proceeding); Title
Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484,491-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976) (civil
proceeding); Kanter v. IRS, 433 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (criminal proceeding).
47.1. 5 U.S.C. § 552(4) (1970).
47.2. Fruehauf Corp. v. Thornton, 507 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1974); Kanter v. IRS, 433 F.
Supp. 812 (N.D. 1ll. 1977). See also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); United States v.
Murdock 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977).
48. These exemptions include material made secret under executive order for national
defense or foreign policy reasons, material relating only to internal personnel rules and prac-
tices, matters specifically exempted by statute, trade secrets, commercial or financial infor-
mation which is confidential, inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda available only to a
party in litigation with the agency, information, the disclosure of which would constitute an
invasion of privacy, investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes, and reports
for the use of an agency responsible for supervision of financial institutions. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(1)-(8) (1970). See generally Bray, Production of Documents and Seizure of Evidence,
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1223, 1244-45 (1974).
49. See note 41 supra.
50. Under exemption five, pre-decisional communications are treated as the attorney's
work-product. The Supreme Court previously had recognized an attorney's work-product
exemption. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Act, however, makes no exception
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seven excludes from the Act investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes.5 ' The latter exemption is intended to prevent
prejudice to the government by earlier or greater access to investiga-
tive files than would have been available to a litigant under discov-
ery rules."2
Although exemptions to the FOIA are to be construed narrowly,53
they nevertheless reduce the effectiveness of the Act as a means of
discovery. These exceptions to disclosure as well as the potential
delay in bringing a suit to compel disclosure should the IRS refuse
to comply at the outset suggest that the summoned taxpayer is able
to obtain no greater information from filing an FOIA request than
he can from instituting civil discovery procedures.
for final agency dispositions. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154 (1975).
According to the rationale of the Court in Sears, "Congress had the attorney's work-product
privilege specifically in mind when it adopted Exemption 5. Id. See also Chamberlain
v. Alexander, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-1176, 1178 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
51. Kanter v. IRS, 433 F. Supp. 812, 819 (N.D. Ill. 1977). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970)
provides that:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-(7) investigatory records
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the produc-
tion of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) de-
prive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a
confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential
information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel.
Law enforcement purposes include those relating to both civil and criminal enforcement.
Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D. Del. 1972). See also Joint Conference Report No.
93-1200, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6291-92, indicating that the
Conferees intended to include both law enforcement and other agencies in the phrase "by an
agency".
52. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
53. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); Washington Research
Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). In
Marathon Le Tourneau Co., Marine Div. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074, 1079 (D. Miss. 1976),
the court found immaterial the plaintiff's alleged need for the information to prepare a
defense. It defined the issue instead as whether the plaintiff, as an "average member of the
public," was entitled to the information.
CHALLENGING TAX SUMMONSES
TAX SUMMONSES AND THE TAX REFORM ACr OF 1976
Third-Party Summonses
Procedural Considerations
IRS summonses may be issued either to a taxpayer under investi-
gation or to third parties, such as banks, attorneys, and accoun-
tants, having possession or control of records bearing on the tax-
payer's liability. 4 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Code did
not require either the IRS or the third party to inform the person
being investigated that A summons had been issued or obeyed. 5
Unless the taxpayer somehow was apprised of the agency's action,
then, he was unable to challenge the legitimacy of third-party sum-
monses, even though he may have justifiable objections to the sum-
mons. Furthermore, as illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1971 de-
cision, Donaldson v. United States,6 the taxpayer, although aware
of the agency's request for documents held by a third party, may
be refused access to the proceeding. After a summons had been
issued to the taxpayer's former employer and his accountant for the
production of employment and compensation records, the taxpayer
in Donaldson, relying on Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules, 5 filed
a motion to intervene in the IRS enforcement action. Writing for the
majority, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the records sought by
the IRS were not the property of the taxpayer but of the employer
and that, therefore, the taxpayer had no right to protest disclosure.
Despite the relevance of the records to his potential liability, the
taxpayer did not possess the "significantly protectable interest"
necessary "for intervention through Rule 24(a)(2) .1 Although the
Court had stated several years previously that "third parties might:
intervene to protect their interests, or in the event the taxpayer is
not a party to the summons before the hearing officer, he, too, may
intervene,"" 9 it concluded in Donaldson that this language was
54. I.R.C. § 7602.
55. Scarafiotti v. Shea, 456 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1972).
56. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) provides for intervention by a party claiming
an interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the action.
58. 400 U.S. at 531. The Court also noted that Rule 81(a)(3) permits the district court
broad discretion to limit the applicability of the Federal Rules, including the right of inter-
vention, in enforcement proceedings. Id. at 528.
59. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964) (taxpayer's attorneys denied injunction to
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merely permissive, not mandatory."0 The Court did not foreclose the
possibility of intervention, however, noting that the district court
might, in its discretion, permit the taxpayer to enter the action
"when the circumstances are proper," as when the IRS issued the
summons for an improper purpose or sought information protected
by the attorney-client privilege.6'
Notwithstanding this dictum, the Court in Donaldson deprived
taxpayers of the opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of a sum-
mons issued to a third party. Intervention was possible only if the
taxpayer could prove impropriety in the summons' issuance, but
unless he could intervene at the outset the taxpayer probably would
be unable to discover any impropriety. With the burden of resisting
disclosure placed upon a third party having only a formal proprie-
tary interest in the records sought, the taxpayer faced a virtually
insurmountable barrier; assuming that timely intervention was
barred, his only alternative was to persuade the third party to chal-
lenge the order and thereby risk the penalties for noncompliance.
Understandably, in practice, most third parties, particularly
banks,12 voluntarily chose to obey the IRS summonses, rendering
the taxpayer powerless to enjoin such compliance. 3 Even if the
court initially accepted jurisdiction to determine whether compli-
ance should be enjoined,64 it ultimately would find that the taxpayer
lacked a "significantly protectable interest" and, thus, standing to
prevent voluntary compliance. 5
Recognizing that the interest of a third party in protecting the
privacy of summoned records is not as great as that of the taxpayer
to whom the records pertain,6 ' Congress amended the Internal Reve-
prevent accountants employed by them from answering summons to produce taxpayer re-
cords in their custody).
60. 400 U.S. at 531. The Court suggested that a balancing of equities would be appropriate
in determining whether to grant or deny intervention. Id. at 530.
61. Id.
62. See Kirschenbaum v. Beerman, 376 F. Supp. 398, 399 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
63. E.g., Cook v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Nev. 1974); Kirschenbaum v.
Beerman, 376 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Hoopes v. IRS, 33 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 74-1233
(D. Utah 1973).
64. E.g., Kirschenbaum v. Beerman, 376 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Hoopes v. IRS, 33
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 74-1233 (D. Utah 1973).
65. For a discussion of the taxpayer's standing to prevent voluntary compliance, see Kir-
schenbaum v. Beerman, 376 F. Supp. 398, 399 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
66. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, reprinted in [1976] U.S. ConE CONG. &
At). NEws 2897, 3203 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 658].
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nue Code to include provisions regulating third-party summonses. 7
Although it included several exceptions,68 section 7609 requires the
IRS to give notice of the summons to any person identified in the
records' description within three days of service and no later than
the fourteenth day prior to the records' examination. 9 The person
entitled to notice also must receive a copy of the summons, and he
may intervene in enforcement proceedings brought under section
7604.71 In addition, the noticee may stay third-party compliance by
serving the third party with a written notice not to comply and by
filing a copy of such notice with the IRS.71 Section 7609, then, appar-
ently overrules those decisions denying the taxpayer injunctive re-
lief to stay voluntary compliance. 2
Section 7609, though, sets forth several exceptions to the third-
party notice requirements. Notice is not required, for example, if the
summonee and person entitled to notice are the same7 3 or if the
summons is issued to determine either the existence of some record
67. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) provides in pertinent part:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "third-party recordkeeper" means-
(A) any mutual savings bank, cooperative bank, domestic building and loan
association, or other savings institution chartered and supervised as a savings
and loan or similar association under Federal or State law, any bank (as defined
in section 581), or any credit union (within the meaning of section
501(c)(14)(A));
(B) any consumer reporting agency. ..
(C) any person extending credit through the use of credit cards or similar
devices;
(D) any broker. ..
(E) any attorney; and
(F) any accountant.
68. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(4) provides that this notice requirement shall be inapplicable to any
summons:
(A) served on the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued,
or any officer or employee of such person,
(B) to determine whether or not records of the business transactions or affairs
of an identified person have been made or kept, or
(C) described in subsection (f) [issued in the name of "John Doe"].
69. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1)(B).
70. Id. at (b)(1). Presumably, the IRS could not defeat this right merely by bringing an
action to enforce the summons under § 7402(b) rather than under § 7604. Sections 7604 and
7609 are part of chapter 78 relating specifically to discovery of liability while § 7402(b) is
included in Chapter 76, which relates to civil actions for the recovery of tax due.
71. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2).
72. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 368-70, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3439, 3797-99 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 938].
73. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(4)(A).
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of an identified person's transactions" or the identity of a person
having a numbered bank account or similar device. 5 In order to
prevent the transfer of assets to frustrate collection,7" notice also is
unnecessary if the summons is designed to aid collection from per-
sons against whom assessments have been made or judgments ren-
dered.7
Substantive Considerations
Seeking to protect the taxpayer's right to privacy, Congress in-
tended through the Tax Reform Act to provide taxpayers with an
opportunity to raise substantive defenses against third-party sum-
monses. Nevertheless, the amended Code provisions do not increase
the substantive rights and defenses of the summoned taxpayer7 but
only assure that such defenses will be raised by the true party in
interest.
Despite Congress' clear intent to protect the taxpayer's right to
privacy, apparently the IRS still may gain informal access to records
held by financial institutions, such as banks, without providing no-
tice to the taxpayer being investigated. Under the Bank Secrecy
74. Id. at (B).
75. Id. at (c)(2)(A).
76. S. REP. No. 938, supra note 72, at 371-72. This exception is inapplicable if the IRS is
attempting to obtain information for purposes other than collection, such as computation of
the taxpayer's taxable income by net worth. Id.
77. I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(B)(i).
78. H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 66, at 309. According to the Committee report, "[these
provisions [of the Act] are not intended to overturn court interpretations of the Fifth amend-
ment or to imply that the noticee necessarily has the same protectable Fifth amendment
interest with respect to records in the possession of a third party which he might have with
respect to records in his own possession." Id. Nevertheless, the Act provides the taxpayer new
defenses, some of which had been available only to the third-party summonee: "the commit-
tee intends that the noticee will be allowed to stand in the shoes of the third-party recordkee-
per and assert certain defenses to enforcement which witnesses are traditionally allowed to
claim, but which may not be available to intervenors (under many court decisions) on grounds
of standing." Id. However, "the noticee will not be permitted to assert as defenses to enforce-
ment issues which only affect the interests of the third-party recordkeeper, such as the
defense that the third-party recordkeeper was not properly served with the summons. . . or
that it will be unduly burdensome . . . for the third-party recordkeeper to comply with the
summons." Id.
To prevent the use of the new procedures as a dilatory tactic, § 7609(e) of the Code provides
that the statute of limitations for the assessment of the taxpayer's liability is to be suspended
during the period of any court action to enforce the summons. H. R. REP. No. 658, supra, at
309-10.
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Act,"9 banks are required to maintain records of substantially all
customer transactions .8  Although not served with legal process,
banks frequently cooperate with agents of the IRS by providing
access to these records upon request, a procedure the Internal Reve-
nue Manual encourages revenue agents to use in investigating po-
tential liability."
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 fails to clarify whether a court should
protect the taxpayer's privacy by excluding evidence obtained
through informal access absent a summons to the third party and
notice to the taxpayer. Although the Supreme Court stated in 1974
that access to records maintained under the Bank Secrecy Act could
be obtained "only by normal legal process,"8 subsequent decisions
have construed this language to permit only the bank, not its cus-
tomers, to demand legal process in the form of a summons or a
subpoena. In United States v. Prevatt,8 for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the voluntary relinquishment
of records by a bank vitiated any requirement of compulsory legal
process to the taxpayer under investigation. 4 Moreover, the district
court's suppression of such records obtained through informal chan-
nels would have been inconsistent with the Bank Secrecy Act which,
the court concluded, was intended to preserve records having a
79. Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970). The Act is codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b
(1970) (retention of records by insured banks and savings and loan institutions), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1951-1959 (1970) (retention of records by all uninsured financial institutions), and 31
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1970) (reporting of domestic and foreign currency transactions).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1970).
81. The Internal Revenue Manual provides:
The importance of bank records to Intelligence investigators and the rapid
changes in banking procedures being brought about by automation, makes it
highly desirable for management officials in the field to meet with and get to
know banking officials personally. The objective of such actions is to improve
relationships with these officials and to open channels of communication benefi-
cial to both parties.
[1977] 5 INT. REv. MAruAL AD. (CCH) § 937(12), at 28,188. See generally Comment,
Government Access to Bank Records in the Aftermath of United States v. Miller and the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 14 Hous. L. REv. 636, 656-57 (1977).
82. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 54 (1974) (dictum). In California
Bankers Ass'n the association challenged the constitutionality of the reporting and record-
keeping provisions of the Bank Secrety Act. In upholding the statute, the Court held inter
alia that the recordkeeping requirement did not violate the fourth amendment because mere
compulsory maintenance of records without any attendant requirement of disclosure did not
constitute a search and seizure. Id. at 52-54.
83. 526 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 402-03.
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"high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investiga-
tions or proceedings." 5 This view is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Miller,8 holding that a taxpayer
under IRS investigation has no protectable interest in records main-
tained pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act. 7
The view that only a bank and not its customers may insist on
issuance of a summons prior to record disclosure, though, largely
defeats the purposes of the Tax Reform Act. The provisions of sec-
tion 7609 are intended to provide a taxpayer with an adequate op-
portunity to contest a third party's disclosure of information per-
taining to the taxpayer, but if evidence obtained through informal
access was deemed admissible at a trial, this opportunity would be
foreclosed. Under section 7609, the taxpayer is granted standing to
raise issues that previously could be raised only by third-party sum-
monees; 5 permitting the taxpayer to insist on issuance of legal pro-
cess would comport with the objective of this provision. 9 Moreover,
a requirement that the decision to comply voluntarily or not be
made by the more interested party would relieve banks of unwanted
responsibility, although it would not expand the taxpayer's
"protectable interest." Extension to the taxpayer of the right to
demand summons issuance prior to disclosure, then, may require
that the taxpayer, as putative noticee, be apprised of informal re-
quests made to third parties for records concerning his affairs and
that he be afforded the right to enjoin compliance until a summons
is issued. In the absence of such a procedure, evidence obtained by
the IRS through informal access should be inadmissible in subse-
quent proceedings.
The informal access procedure, also, may constitute a breach of
the bank's implied warranty of nondisclosure. Because banking in-
stitutions impliedly agree "not to divulge information without the
85. Id. at 402 (citing California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1976)).
86. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
87. Id. at 441-43. In Miller the Supreme Court concluded that, absent such a protectable
interest, a summons issued to a third-party bank did not violate the fourth amendment rights
of the depositor under investigation. Id. at 443.
88. H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 66, at 309.
89. See id. at 308. The Report's language suggests that informal access by the IRS would
be improper: "In cases where noticees do exercise their right to request noncompliance, the
Service is not to seek to inspect the books or records subject to the summons unless the
Service first goes into court and obtains an order, against the third-party recordkeeper, for
enforcement of its summons." Id. (emphasis supplied).
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customer's consent unless compelled by court order,"' 0 a bank may
be liable if it permits the IRS to inspect customer records prior to
the issuance of a summons." Moreover, even assuming that a sum-
mons was issued, voluntary compliance by the bank may breach its
warranty since a summons alone, absent an enforcement order, may
not constitute a "court order" within the meaning of the bank's
warranty; voluntary disclosure at any time before the district court
orders enforcement of the summons, then, would be unlawful.2
A final ambiguity with regard to third-party summonses under
the Tax Reform Act concerns the taxpayer's right to counsel at an
investigatory proceeding. The Act makes no provision for protecting
the taxpayer's interests by permitting, upon request, the presence
of his attorney during either the questioning of a third-party wit-
ness or the examination of the records at issue. 3 Although the
Administrative Procedure Act" allows representation of witnesses
compelled to testify, whether the person under investigation95 or
his counsel have a right to be present at the examination of a wit-
ness in a fact-finding, non-adjudicative, investigatory proceeding is
unclear.
90. Valley Bank of Nev. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657, 542 P.2d 977, 979, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 553, 555 (1975); e.g., Milochnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); First Nat'l Bank
in Lenox v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Iowa 1970); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J.Eq. 386, 146 A.
34 (1929).
91. Cf. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J.Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929). In Brex the court enjoined a public
prosecutor's request for inspection of bank records, stating that he had an adequate means
of inspection through a grand jury subpoena and that the bank had an implied obligation of
nondisclosure.
92. Of course, the plaintiff-taxpayer must demonstrate damages. See Brex v. Smith, 104
N.J.Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929).
93. See United States v. Kershaw, 436 F. Supp. 552 (D. Or. 1977). The IRS sought to
question a taxpayer's accountant who had been working under the direction of the taxpayer's
attorney. The court held that the taxpayer's attorney could not be present but that the
accountant's attorney could protect against disclosure of any privileged information. Id. at
553.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970).
95. Justice Douglas has suggested that due process requires such a right. United States v.
Donaldson, 400 U.S. 533, 538 (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. Indeed, the right of a witness to be represented by counsel has not been resolved. FCC
v. Schreiber, 329 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1964) (availability of right to counsel in non-adjudicative,
fact-finding investigation is undecided by Supreme Court but, even if it exists, does not
include calling of witnesses or cross-examination); Smith v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 803
(D.N.J. 1966) (existence of right to counsel at IRS investigatory proceeding unresolved but
immaterial if voluntary appearance constitutes a waiver); United States v. Steel, 238 F.
Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (existence of right to counsel at investigation unresolved but
immaterial if agency precludes only representation of two parties by same counsel). An
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An early case decided by the District Court for the District of
Connecticut equated IRS investigations with grand jury proceedings
and held that the need for secrecy would be sufficient reason to deny
witnesses counsel. 97 If this position is maintained, then, arguably,
the taxpayer's attorney may be excluded when the IRS is question-
ing a third party even though this testimony may affect the tax-
payer's liability. The equation of the two, however, obscures the
most fundamental distinction, namely, that the principal purposes
of grand jury secrecy-to protect witnesses, to avoid prematurely
alerting a target witness who may flee to escape questioning, and
to protect innocent target parties should an indictment not
issue-are inapplicable to an IRS examination. Indeed, at least one
court has repudiated the analogy between grand jury proceedings
and IRS examinations. 8 Thus, unless significant delay would result,
the taxpayer's counsel should be permitted to be present during the
IRS examination initiated by a summons whenever a danger of
prejudice to the taxpayer exists.
John Doe Summonses
If the Service suspects that an unidentified individual has failed
to disclose or to discharge his full tax liability, it may issue a "John
Doe" summons to persons possessing information leading to his
identification.99 Although no statutory authority existed for IRS is-
suance of John Doe summonses prior to 1976, the Supreme Court
upheld the procedure in 1975. In United States v. Bisceglia,1 '1 the
IRS discovered large deposits of old and badly deteriorated $100
bills and suspected that transactions relating to the deposits had
not been reported. To aid in its investigation, it issued John Doe
summonses.
investigation for civil tax liability is an investigatory, fact-finding proceeding. Commissioner
v. Backer, 178 F. Supp. 256 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.
1960).
97. United States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1949). The Supreme Court, in dicta,
also has equated agency investigations with grand jury proceedings. See United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-44 (1950).
Neither opinion, however, discusses the analogy in the context of the right to counsel.
98. See Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960) (witness entitled to counsel
of own choice, even if counsel also retained by taxpayer under investigation); accord, SEC v.
Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (counsel for witness could not be excluded although he
represented other witnesses under investigation).
99. See note 114 infra.
100. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
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In upholding the procedure, the Court focused on the broad lan-
guage of the IRS's statutory summons power, which authorizes the
investigation of "all persons . . . who may be liable."'' According
to the Court, this language was "inconsistent with an interpretation
that would limit the issuance of summonses to investigations...
[focusing] upon a particular return, a particular named person, or
a particular potential tax liability.'01 2 Moreover, because such sum-
monses require judicial enforcement, the Service was prevented
from taking arbitrary or capricious action.' 3
In the wake of Bisceglia, the IRS formalized the issuance proce-
dure, requiring that no John Doe summonses be issued without prior
approval by the district chief of the IRS operational division re-
questing the summons and by the IRS Regional Counsel's office.""
Congress, however, considered even these safeguards insufficient to
protect the taxpayer's right to privacy and included in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 further requirements for summons issuance.' 5
Under the new provisions, John Doe summonses may issue
only after a court proceeding in which the Secretary establishes
that-
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular per-
son or ascertainable group or class of persons,(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or
group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply
with any provision of any internal revenue law, and
101. Id. at 149 (quoting I.R.C. § 7601) (emphasis in original). Section 7601"authorizes the
IRS to "inquire after. . . all persons .. who may be liable to pay any internal revenue
tax."
102. 420 U.S. at 149.
103. Id. at 151. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart noted the "breathtaking" trans-
formation of the IRS's general investigatory authority into a broader exploratory power,
achieved by tracking the Service's duties under § 7601 with its summons power under §-7602.
Id. at 153, 157. Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion, however, that particular
factual situations raised an
overwhelming probability, if not certitude, that one individual or entity was
responsible for the deposits. The uniformly deteriorated condition of the cur-
rency and the amount, combined with other unusual aspects, gave the Service
good reason, and indeed, the duty to investigate. . . .The summons, in short,
was issued pursuant to a genuine investigation. The Service was not engaged in
researching some general problem; its mission was not exploratory.
Id. at 142-43 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
104. I.R. News Release, IR-1484 (May 8, 1975), reprinted in [1975] 9 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) $ 6584.
105. I.R.C. § 7609(0.
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(3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination
of the records (and the identity of the person or persons with
respect to whose liability the summons is issued) is not readily
available from other sources.'5 '
Although Congress sought to prevent the use of John Doe sum-
monses in "fishing expeditions,"'' 7 it nevertheless intended to pre-
serve their utility as tools for investigation. Accordingly, prior to
issuance, the IRS need not show probable cause for its belief that
civil fraud or criminal activities are involved. Rather, it must dem-
onstrate only that a transaction has or may have occurred reasona-
bly suggesting the possibility of unreported tax liability, that good
faith efforts have been made to explore alternative methods of in-
vestigation, and that issuance of a John Doe summons is the only
practical means of obtaining the necessary information.108
Prior to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had discussed limita-
tions on the issuance of John Doe summonses paralleling those codi-
fied in the Act. In United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,'"9
the IRS issued a John Doe summons to ascertain the identity of
various lessors of the Humble Oil Company. Neither Humble Oil
nor the lessors were under investigation for failure to comply with
tax laws;"10 rather, the IRS sought to advance its research on lease
restoration requirements. Refusing to enforce the summons, the
Fifth Circuit found no nexus "between [the] information sought
and a specific investigation of specific individuals""' and declared
that the IRS could not use its summons power as an "unrestricted
license to enlist the aid of citizens in its data gathering projects.""'1 2
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision in Humble
Oil and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit"' for further consid-
106. Id. The restrictions in § 7609(f) express the distinction between a valid investigatory
purpose and an invalid exploratory purpose made by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion in Bisceglia. See note 103 supra.
107. S. REP. No. 938, supra note 72, at 373-74.
108. Id.
109. 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 943 (1975), aff'd, 518 F.2d 747 (5th
Cir. 1975).
110. Id. at 954.
111. Id. at 960 (citing United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 346 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.
Tex. 1972)).
112. 488 F.2d at 963.
113. 421 U.S. 943 (1975). See notes 100-03 supra.
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eration in light of the Court's decision in Bisceglia, upholding the
non-statutory John Doe summons procedure after IRS discovery of
deteriorated $100 bills. The Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior decision,
however, stating that the information sought in Bisceglia, unlike
that sought in Humble Oil, related to a specific, extraordinary
transaction. Moreover, in Humble Oil no demonstrable facts sug-
gested the likelihood of unpaid taxes, and no IRS investigation was
advanced by the issuance of the summons; instead, the IRS merely
wished to expedite its research on lease restoration."'
The Fifth Circuit's test in Humble Oil, requiring the existence of
both a specific, extraordinary transaction and an ongoing investiga-
tion prior to issuance of a John Doe summons, offers a meaningful
and objective standard on which to base investigatory procedures.
While the relevant provisions of the Tax Reform Act are ambiguous
in many respects-for example, they fail to describe how narrow the
requisite "ascertainable group or class of persons" under investiga-
tion must be before summonses can issue-use of the Fifth Circuit's
more definitive standards, in conjunction with the Tax Reform Act,
would implement the congressional intention of protecting the tax-
payer's right to privacy without unduly hampering IRS investiga-
tion of alleged violations.
SUBSTANTIvE DEFENSES
As noted, the Tax Reform Act was not intended to alter a tax-
payer's substantive defenses to summons enforcement but only to
modify the procedures for summons issuance and resistance.115
Three grounds exist for substantive challenge: IRS noncompliance
with formal summons requirements, privileged attorney-client com-
munications, and violations of the fourth and fifth amendments.
114. United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 747, 748 (5th Cir. 1975). "John Doe"
summonses also have been issued to obtain the identities of the clients of a tax preparer,
Berkowitz v. United States, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1973), to learn the names of shareholders
who may have incurred unreported tax liabilities, Miles v. United Founders Corp., 5 F. Supp.
413 (D.N.J. 1933), and to ascertain the names of owners of an insurance company's stock held
by banks as nominees, trustees, or custodians, United States v. Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318
(D. Conn. 1974). See also Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Duke, 379 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
115. H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 66, at 309.
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IRS Noncompliance with Formal Requirements
Taxpayers seeking to challenge a summons frequently base their
attack on the failure of the IRS to meet the substantive prerequis-
ites to summons enforcement. In United States v. Powell,'"' the
Supreme Court mandated that before a district court can enforce a
summons a proposed IRS investigation must meet four require-
ments: first, a legitimate purpose must exist for the investigation;
second, the inquiry must be relevant to that purpose; third, the
information sought must not be already in the IRS' possession; and
finally, the proper administrative provisions under the Code must
have been followed.11 7 The IRS, however, need not show probable
cause in summons issuance,"" and the aggrieved taxpayer has the
burden of proving noncompliance.119
Legitimate Purpose
In 1964, the Supreme Court stated in dictum that a taxpayer
under IRS investigation could challenge a summons issued for the
"improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prose-
cution." 2 ' Seven years later, the Court clarified its legitimate pur-
pose requirement in Donaldson v. United States,'"' holding that
taxpayer summonses must be issued "in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution."' 2 Although a summons
issued solely to aid in a criminal investigation would be improper,
it is not subject to challenge merely because it could result in a
criminal charge against the taxpayer.' 2 -' Thus, the taxpayer may
116. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
117. Id. at 57-58.
118. Id. at 51.
119. Id. at 58. Although the taxpayer bears the burden of proof, to achieve enforcement
the IRS must substantiate its assertion of compliance. United States v. Wright Motor Co.,
536 F.2d 1090, 1095 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 372 (3d Cir.
1975).
120. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964); see Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-
73 (9th Cir. 1957).
121. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
122. Id. at 536 (emphasis supplied).
122.1. The Supreme Court, in United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 46 U.S.L.W. 4713
(June 20, 1978), noted that "[tihis result is inevitable because Congress has created a law
enforcement system in which criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined." Id. at
4716. "Congress has not categorized tax fraud investigations into civil and criminal compo-
nents. Any limitation on the good faith use of an Internal Revenue summons must reflect this
statutory premise." Id. at 4717.
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challenge enforcement of a summons issued during the pendency of
a criminal action, 2 3 but he may not prevent it from becoming effec-
tive simply because criminal, as well as civil, prosecution may re-
sult.124 Nor is the summons necessarily invalid if the agent issuing
the summons is pursuing only a criminal investigation, since the
nature of the inquiry is subject to change prior to transfer to the
Justice Department.' 4. 1
Whether a criminal prosecution has been "recommended" within
the meaning of Donaldson, thereby rendering invalid subsequent
summons issuance, has been an issue of controversy among the
United States Courts of Appeals. 2 5 The Tenth Circuit endorsed a
narrow view of the legitimate purpose requirement, holding that, at
the earliest, recommendation occurs when the IRS forwards its case
to the Department of Justice for prosecution.' 2 Although the Third
Circuit also held invalid summonses issued following a recommen-
dation for criminal prosecution, it included in its definition of "prior
to recommendation" the requirement that the IRS request for a
summons be in good faith and not an attempt to bypass restrictions
on criminal discovery. Thus, the court stated that "[a] preceding
123. 400 U.S. at 532-33.
124. Id. See also United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. Hansen
Niederhauser Co., 522 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749
(4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971).
The summons also will not be unenforceable merely biecause a special agent has been assigned
to the case. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1971); United States v. Fisher,
500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Richardson, 337 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Colo. 1971). In United States v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 474 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. 1973), the court held enforceable a summons issued
pursuant to an investigation instituted at the request of the Justice Department.
124.1. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 46 U.S.L.W. 4713 (June 20, 1978).
125. Whether prosecution has been recommended is determined in light of the facts as they
existed at the time the summons was issued. United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973);
United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757,
aff'd en banc, 487 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971); cf. United States v. Held,
435 F.2d 1361 (6th Cir. 1970) (secondary purpose of civil investigation sufficient). The sum-
mons cannot be defeated by showing that a subsequent recommendation for prosecution was
made. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973). The Seventh Circuit has held,
however, that the district court may consider the intervening fact of a criminal indictment
after issuance of a summons in determining whether to enforce the summons. United States
v. Monsey, 429 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1970).
126. United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d. 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 1972); accord, United
States v. Cecil E. Lucas Gen. Contractors, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (D.S.C. 1975); United
States v. Kyriaco, 326 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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Justice Department recommendation to prosecute is not the sine
qua non for proving that an Internal Revenue summons was issued
for an improper purpose.' ' 27 Finally, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit espoused a broad view of the legitimate purpose requirement,
deeming summonses issued in bad faith unenforceable even if issued
before criminal prosecution was recommended. Under this test, a
summons would be invalid if "the investigating agent had already
formed a firm purpose to recommend criminal prosecution even
though he had not as yet made a formal recommendation .... '"12
This conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court in United States
v. LaSalle National Bank. 12.- In LaSalie the Court rejected the view
adopted by the Third Circuit and impliedly that of the District of
Columbia Circuit in favor of an interpretation of the Donaldson
standard similar to that adopted in the Tenth Circuit. In dictum,
the Court stated that,
[g]iven the interrelated criminal/civil nature of tax fraud inves-
tigation whenever it remains within the jurisdiction of the Serv-
ice, and given the utility of the summons to investigate civil tax
liability, we decline to impose the prophylactic restraint on the
summons authority any earlier than at the recommendation to
the Department of Justice. We cannot deny that the potential for
expanding the criminal discovery rights of the Justice Depart-
ment or for usurping the role of the grand jury exists at the point
of the recommendation by the special agent. But we think the
possibilities for abuse of these policies are remote before the rec-
ommendation to Justice takes place and do not justify imposing
an absolute ban on the use of the summons before that point.
Earlier imposition of the ban, given the balance of policies and
civil law enforcement interests, would unnecessarily hamstring
the performance of the tax determination and collection func-
tions by the Service.' .2
Relevance
As enunciated by the Supreme Court in Powell, the second re-
quirement for summons enforcement involves a showing by the IRS
127. United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 625 (3d Cir. 1975).
128. United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
128.1. 46 U.S.L.W. 4713 (June 20, 1978).
128.2. Id. at 4717 n.15.
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that the inquiry is relevant to a proper purpose." 9 Should a taxpayer
allege noncompliance with this prerequisite, the IRS must meet a
test similar to that used in grand jury investigations: whether the
desired inspection of records "would throw light upon the correct-
ness of the taxpayer's returns."13 The judiciary has applied this test
most strictly in the context of third-party summonses.' 3 I Notwith-
standing the general rule, some courts also have permitted investi-
gations that 'might' throw light upon subjects under legitimate
inquiry."'3
Although the standard for relevance and materiality required for
summons enforcement may be more lenient than that required to
admit evidence at trial,' the IRS nevertheless must exhibit a
"realistic expectation" that the records summoned will be related
to the investigation. 34 Thus, although the Seventh Circuit enforced
129. 379 U.S. at 57; see note 117 supra & accompanying text.
130. United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1972).
131. Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1968); accord, United States v.
Luther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973).
132. United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (enforcing summons
for corporate minutes of corporation and affiliates); see United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d
1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 515 (3d Cir. 1971); Foster
v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); United States
v. Campbell, 390 F. Supp. 711 (D.S.D. 1975).
The test for relevancy has been stated succinctly by Chief Judge Lumbard in United States
v. Harrington:
The question. . . is. . . whether the articulated standard, 'might throw light
upon the correctness of the return', is in the particular circumstances an indica-
tion of a realistic expectation rather than an idle hope that something may be
discovered.
388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968).
133. United States v. Ruggeiro, 425 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom.
Kyriaco v. United States, 401 U.S. 922 (1971); United States v. Dauphin Deposit trust Co.,
385 F.2d 129, 130-31 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); United States v. McKay,
372 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1967).
134. United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968). With regard to the
relevancy issue, the question arises as to what may be summoned and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, whether the IRS, pursuant to its summons power, may require the summonee to
disclose incriminating evidence. Illustrative of this question are the cases deciding whether
the taxpayer may be required to furnish copies of his handwriting. In United States v.
Campbell, 524 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1975), the court held that the taxpayer could be required
to manufacture copies of her handwriting as "other data" under § 7602. Accord, United States
v. Rosinsky, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9206 (D.N.C. 1976). The Sixth Circuit, however, denied
the enforceability of a summons requiring the taxpayer to appear personally to give an agent
exemplars of her handwriting, concluding that "other data" did not authorize the production
of handwriting exemplars not yet in existence. United States v. Brown, 536 F.2d 117, 119 (6th
Cir. 1976). The court reasoned that if general language such as "and other data" follows a
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a summons seeking disclosure of a taxpayer's journal and work pap-
ers because the papers contained records of actual transactions,' '1 5
the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement when the IRS sought to ob-
tain proposed budgets of a corporation and its affiliates.'3 In the
latter case, the court based its decision on the ground that the
proposed budgets did not identify "actual transactions" but instead
were materials sought solely for the convenience of the IRS.'37
Prior Examination and Proper Procedure
Under the third Supreme Court requirement for summons en-
forcement, information sought from a taxpayer must not be in the
possession of the IRS at that time. A frequently litigated issue in
this regard involves section 1705(b) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which provides that, for any given tax year, only a single inspection
may be made of a taxpayer's records unless the taxpayer requests
otherwise or the Secretary gives written notice of the necessity for
additional inspection.'3  Designed to prevent revenue agents from
abusing their broad investigatory powers by needless and repeated
examinations, this "one-inspection" rule requires that an agent pro-
specific enumeration of items, it is to be construed narrowly to mean "other of like kind."
Id. at 122.
Summons enforcement also will be denied if the demands are unreasonable, Local 174 v.
United States, 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956), because an overly broad summons may violate
the summonees' fourth amendment rights. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
650-53 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946); United States
v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1974). "[The government] must identify with some
precision the documents it wishes to inspect." United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.,
385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967). If the district court in its discretion determines that the
summons is too broad, United States v. Ruggiero, 425 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1970); Dunn
v. Ross, 356 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1966), it may modify the summons to conform to a
reasonable standard. Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1968); Dunn v. Ross,
356 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1966). See also United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 686 n.4
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bowman, 435 F.2d 467, 470 (3d Cir. 1970).
135. United States v. Interstate Tool & Eng'r Corp., 526 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1975).
136. United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
137. Id. at 1273-75. A summons issued to a bank to provide certain trust records of thirty-
two trusts sought in connection with an investigation of the bank itself was enforced in United
States v. Sun First Nat'l Bank, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975).
138. I.R.C. § 7605(b) provides:
No Taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations,
and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be made for each
taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary, after
investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is
necessary.
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cure his supervisor's authorization before repeated examinations
will be permitted.'39
The majority of jurisdictions apply the one-inspection rule only
to taxpayers and not to third-party summonees.'4 Although the Tax
Reform Act permits the taxpayer to "stand in the shoes of the third
party record keeper,"' 4 ' application of the one-inspect'on rule proba-
bly will remain limited. The clear purpose of this statutory restric-
tion is to prevent harassment of the taxpayer by repeated demands
for records and not to hamstring IRS investigations. The Act does
not grant the taxpayer standing to contest summonses when the
records are in the possession of a third party; then, the burden of
disclosure is on that party, not on the taxpayer.4 2
In challenging summonses, taxpayers frequently have charged
noncompliance by the IRS with the notice requirements of the one-
inspection rule. As a result, courts have distinguished second
inspections from "continuing" inspections, which do not require
that notice be given.4 3 Notice, then, is unnecessary prior to separate
examinations in the course of an ongoing investigation.'44 In addi-
tion, the one-inspection rule is inapplicable if re-examination is an
attempt to determine if the taxpayer is liable for a different tax or
for a different year.4 5
139. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55-56 (1964).
140. Moloney v. United States, 521 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975);
United States v. Krilich, 470 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1972); United
States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1969); Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 371 F.2d 697
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th
Cir. 1963); cf. DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963)
(holding reexamination valid). But see United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 376 (3d Cir.
1975), in which the court held that a summons issued to examine records previously examined
while in the possession of a third party may constitute a second inspection within the meaning
of § 7605(b).
141. H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 66, at 309.
142. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 was not intended to allow the taxpayer to raise issues
peculiar to the interest of the third-party summonee. Id.
143. National Plate & Window Glass Co. v. United States, 254 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958); United States v. Fitzgerald, 390 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ind. 1975);
see United States v. Schwartz, 469 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d
40 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gioradano, 419 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1037 (1970); United States v. Shlom, 301 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 420 F.2d
263 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970).
144. United States v. House, 524 F.2d 1035, 1043 (3d Cir. 1975) (as amended on denial of
rehearing 1976).
145. United States v. Kendrick, 518 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Privileged Communications
Under certain circumstances, the attorney-client privilege may
shield information from disclosure to the IRS. Required to demon-
strate that the privilege is applicable, 46 the summoned taxpayer
must do more than merely assert a broad, general claim to confiden-
tiality; he must carry this burden of proof for each communication
he desires to withhold.'47 Although state law may protect the profes-
sional relationships between accountant and client,' bank and de-
positor,49 and stenographer and client,5 ' federal law acknowledges
only the attorney-client privilege 5' and, in addition, delineates the
breadth of the privilege. 52
In Fisher v. United States, 3 in which two circuit court decisions
were combined for review, the Supreme Court defined the scope of
the attorney-client privilege in tax summons cases. The IRS had
summoned documents prepared by the taxpayers' accountants that
later were delivered by the taxpayers to their attorneys.'54 The Court
146. United States v. Kratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975).
147. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 n.18
(5th Cir. 1969); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637-40 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963).
148. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); United States v. Wainwright, 413
F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 1009 (1970); United States v. Sharpe, 38
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 76-5570 (E.D. Ky. 1976); United States v. Tsukuno, 341 F. Supp. 839
(N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd without opinion, 478 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1973).
149. United States v. Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1976).
150. United States v. Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1977).
151. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
152. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1125 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Finley,
434 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1970); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); Colton v.
United States, 306 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States
v. Sharpe, 38 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 76-5570 (E.D. Ky. 1976). But see United States v. Cromer,
483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
United States v. Cromer recognized that FED. RULE EVD. 501, which had not been enacted
at the time of the court's decision, may dictate a different result. 483 F.2d at 101 n.18.
Although Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "in civil actions and
proceedings . . . the rule [governing] the privilege . . . shall be determined in accordance
with State law," the legislative history indicates that "in non-diversity civil cases, federal
privilege law will generally apply." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. -'
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7100.
153. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
154. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974) (summons enforced in absence of
sufficient possessory interest); United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974) (enforce-
ment denied over reasonable expectation of privacy).
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rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the records at issue were pro-
tected from disclosure by the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, 5 stating that the fifth amendment protects the tax-
payer only from testifying against himself under compulsion, not
from the coerced production of evidence even though it can be used
against him. If records held by the taxpayer are not protected by the
fifth amendment, then, the Court reasoned, this same information
could not be shielded from disclosure by transferring it to an attor-
ney and subsequently claiming an attorney-client privilege.'5 Thus,
because the plaintiffs in Fisher could not claim a fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination for documents prepared by their
accountants, they were precluded from asserting an attorney-client
privilege when the same documents were delivered to counsel.'57
The Court based its decision largely on the rationale of the
attorney-client privilege. Protecting confidential communications
by a client to his attorney, the privilege encourages full disclosure
of all relevant information, thus enabling the client to obtain in-
formed legal advice.' 8 However, in the interest of ascertaining the
truth at trial, the Court reasoned, the privilege should apply only if
necessary to promote full disclosure. In Fisher, delivery of the
documents to counsel did not jeopardize the full disclosure interest
because the IRS could obtain the documents if retained by the tax-
payer himself.'5 ' Any exercise of the privilege, therefore, was super-
fluous in that the fifth amendment offered no protection to the
taxpayer if the documents were in his possession.' 0
In some instances the attorney-client privilege may extend to the
155. 425 U.S. at 397-99. The Court held that, although the fifth amendment protected the
taxpayer from testifying against himself involuntarily, no element of unlawful compulsion
existed if his attorney were ordered to produce the evidence. The Court held further that
agency theory did not extend this personal privilege to the taxpayer's attorney. Id.
156. Id. at 403-04. Conversely, the Court concluded that "when the client himself would
be privileged from production of the document either as a party at common law . . . or as
exempt from self-incrimination, the attorney having possession of the document is not bound
to produce." Id. at 404 (quoting 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2307, at 592 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961)) (emphasis in original).
157. Id. at 414. See generally Note, Fifth Amendment Protection Against Self-
Incrimination in Tax Records: Fisher v. United States, 30 Sw. L.J. 788 (1976); see also
Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L.
REv. 67 (1969).
158. 425 U.S. at 403.
159. Id. at 403-05.
160. Id. at 414.
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testimony of an accountant employed by the taxpayer's attorney.''
If the accountant's services have been necessary to providing effec-
tive legal advice, then testimony by the accountant will be privi-
leged at trial."12 Although information disclosed for the purpose of
preparing a tax return is not privileged, 163 prior employment of the
accountant by the taxpayer for that purpose will not defeat the
privilege.' 4 Thus, if the taxpayer can show that the accountant's aid
comprised an "integral part" of the legal advice rendered him,' '
then confidential communications to his attorney may not be re-
vealed through the accountant's testimony.
Shielding only confidential communications by the taxpayer, the
attorney-client privilege provides the relationship itself no protec-
tion.' 6 Thus, the privilege is unavailable to withhold the client's
identity,6 7 to preclude disclosure of the attorney's fee schedule,, 8 or
to shield the nature of services rendered by the attorney.' These
161. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Kovel, 296
F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Bauer
v. Orsen, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966); accord, United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297
(9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
162. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972).
163. United States v. Gurther, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973). But see United States v.
Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1973), in which the court indicated that disclosures
made by the client to the attorney for the purpose of preparing a return pursuant to a bona-
fide attorney-client relationship would be privileged.
164. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972).
165. Id.
166. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339,
347 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
167. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963);
Gannet v. First Nat'l State Bank, 410 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.J. 1976); cf. Mauch v. Commis-
sioner, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940) (identity of clients whose money was in attorney-tax-
payer's bank account not protected by attorney-client privilege). But see Tillotson v.
Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965). See generally 27 MERCER L. REv. 1213 (1976).
Because the attorney-client privilege fails to protect a client's identity, a "John Doe"
summons issued to a bank for information regarding an attorney's trust account to determine
the identity of a client will not violate the attorney-client privilege. Gannet v. First Nat'l
State Bank of N.J., 410 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.J.), rev'd on other grounds, 540 F.2d 619 (3d
Cir. 1976). See also Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1028 (1966). But see Tillotson v. Boughnor, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); Baird v. Koerner,
279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
168. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974).
169. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v. Long, 328 F. Supp.
223 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
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exceptions appear to comport with the Supreme Court's limited
application of the attorney-client privilege in Fisher, permitting the
withholding only of confidential communications necessary to the
encouragement of full disclosure.'70
CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES
Fourth Amendment
An IRS summons compelling the disclosure of records constitutes
a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.' 7' Conse-
quently, courts will refuse to order disclosure if enforcement of the
summons will interfere unreasonably with the taxpayer's exercise of
his constitutional rights. Recently, however, challenges to civil sub-
poenas have proved unsuccessful,' 72 and the Supreme Court has
questioned whether the fourth amendment's presumption of privacy
is even applicable to taxpayers.1 73
In 1969, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the
taxpayer's claim that IRS summons enforcement procedures vio-
lated his fourth amendment rights. Balancing the need of the IRS
to conduct a search174 against the resultant invasion of taxpayer
privacy, the court in United States v. Roundtree'75 noted that volun-
tary compliance by taxpayers constituted the primary means of
revenue law enforcement,' 71 the IRS necessarily relying on the tax-
payer's own books and records. Moreover, both the courts and the
general public have condoned the use of summonses as a valid
means of assuring compliance.' 77 Addressing the potential invasion
170. 425 U.S. at 403.
171. In United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1969), the court compared
the tax summons to a search warrant, subject to the fourth amendment prohibition of arbi-
trary invasions of an individual's privacy by government agents. The court cited Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967), for the proposition that such a search requires a
"balancing [ofl the need to search against the invasion which the search entails." 420 F.2d
at 850.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
173. Couch v. United States. 409 U.S. at 335-36.
174. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1969). In considering the
protection afforded the individual, the court indicated that a tax summons is at least equiva-
lent to a search warrant.
175. 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969).
176. Id. at 850-51.
177. Id.
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of taxpayer privacy engendered by the search, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized that, although the Service need not show probable
cause,'"8 it must demonstrate that the objective requirements of
investigative legitimacy and relevance have been met.' 9 In light of
these considerations, the court concluded that no fourth amend-
ment rights were violated by the IRS enforcement procedures.
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court appear to support the
Fifth Circuit's conclusions regarding fourth amendment chal-
lenges.'8 In Couch v. United States, '8' for example, the Court noted
in dictum that the tax system is dependent primarily upon honest
and voluntary self-reporting by taxpayers.'8 2 One court has noted
that under such a system the need for access to individual records,
tempered by the judicial scrutiny required for summons enforce-
ment, outweighs the burden of invasion.'83
The fourth amendment also might be invoked to challenge an IRS
summons that is unreasonable or overly vague. With regard to civil
subpoenas seeking production of business records and papers, the
Supreme Court has stated that the fourth amendment "at most
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or
breadth in the things required to be 'particularly described,' if also
the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized to make and
the materials specified are relevant.' 81 4 Nevertheless, such chal-
lenges usually are viewed with suspicion, and the courts will simply
limit the scope of the summons and then order enforcement.'
8 5
178. Id. (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964)).
179. 420 F.2d at 850-51.
180. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973).
181. Id. In Couch the Court rejected the taxpayer's fourth amendment challenge to the
validity of a summons for records in the custody of her accountant. The Court held that "the
necessary expectation of privacy to launch a valid Fourth Amendment claim does not exist."
Id. at 336 n.19.
182. Id. at 335-36.
183. See United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1969). The taxpayer's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" concerning his records apparently is dissolved merely
because the tax law requires that the information be reported. This result fails to distinguish
between the law and its enforcement. Analogously, the mere illegality of possession of certain
material, such as controlled substances, in itself does not sanction indiscriminate searches
and seizures of such materials.
184. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973). Pursuant to a
general investigation of professional tax preparation services, the IRS issued a summons for
all returns and supporting documents retained by appellant's service for a three-year period.
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Fourth amendment protection has been restricted most severely
in taxpayer challenges to the investigation of third-party records. In
United States v. Miller,"'5 agents of the Treasury Department pre-
sented grand jury subpoenas issued in blank to several banks main-
taining Miller's accounts. Miller subsequently moved to suppress,
contending that the subpoenas were defective and that the materi-
als had been obtained in violation of his fourth amendment rights.'87
The Supreme Court held that, because Miller neither owned nor
possessed the bank records under investigation, he lacked a protect-
able interest sufficient to invoke the fourth amendment right to
privacy.' 8 Checks and deposits evidencing transactions with the
bank are not confidential communications but, rather, are instru-
ments used for commercial purposes. That Miller had made his
records available to the bank for a limited purpose only did not
expand his interest: "[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the government.""'8 The Court concluded that information
knowingly revealed to the public is unprotected by the fourth
amendment.' 0
A comparison of the Court's decision in Miller with its reasoning
in Couch, that taxpayers can have little expectation of privacy if
disclosure of personal information is required by law,'"' suggests that
The Fourth Circuit held that a summons will not be enforced if it is too broad and vague
and if"it appears that the purpose of the summons is a rambling exploration of a third party's
files." Id. at 754-55. Ultimately, the court limited the summons to a list of appellant's clients,
provided the IRS could not otherwise obtain one. Id. at 755.
186. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
187. Id. at 438-40.
188. Id. at 440-43.
189. Id. at 443.
190. Id. at 442. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Quoting extensively from the
California Supreme Court's decision in Borrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d
590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974), which reached the opposite conclusion on a similar issue,
Justice Brennan argued that a bank customer has a protected expectation of privacy, the
information being revealed to the bank only for limited internal purposes. 425 U.S. at 448
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall's dissent noted that the result in Miller confirmed his prediction in Cali-
fornia Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), upholding the constitutionality of the
Bank Secrecy Act. Quoting from his prior dissent, Marshall wrote: "By accepting the Govern-
ment's bifurcated approach to the recordkeeping requirement and the acquisition of records,
the majority engages in a hollow charade whereby Fourth Amendment claims are to be
labeled premature until such time as they can be deemed too late." 435 U.S. at 455 (quoting
416 U.S. at 97) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191. 409 U.S. at 335-36.
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fourth amendment challenges to third-party summonses probably
would be unsuccessful. In particular, if the third-party record holder
acts as more than a mere custodian, the taxpayer will be precluded
from asserting the reasonable expectation of privacy necessary to
invoke fourth amendment protection.
The Fifth Amendment
Several recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that challenges
to third-party summonses based on the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination probably would prove as unsuccessful as
those based on the fourth amendment. In Couch v. United States, '12
for example, a taxpayer routinely delivered records to an indepen-
dent accountant for the preparation of her tax return."' When the
accountant was summoned by the IRS, the taxpayer asserted that
disclosure would violate her rights under the fifth amendment. Not-
ing that compliance with a summons issued to a third party requires
no action by the taxpayer, the Court determined that the direct
compulsion necessary to invoke fifth amendment protection was
absent; thus, the Court enforced the summons. 4 According to the
Court's rationale, the privilege against compelled testimony is per-
sonal, attaching only to the individual and not the information. As
a result, it does not follow the material into the hands of a third
party. 195
A year later the Supreme Court placed additional limitations on
fifth amendment challenges to summonses issued directly to tax-
payers. In Bellis v. United States,"'" the former partner of a three-
person law firm had received a grand jury subpoena seeking disclo-
sure of the partnership's records. Rejecting the partner's contention
that the fifth amendment protected the records at issue, the Court
concluded that disclosure was mandated because the records were
192. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
193. Id. at 324.
194. Id. at 328-29. The Court in Couch indicated that "situations may well arise where
constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and
insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact." Id.
at 333 (footnote omitted). However, the Court's decision in Miller, see notes 186-90 supra &
accompanying text, in which the bank acted merely as an intermediary for the taxpayer's
personal transactions, intimates that such instances probably will be infrequent.
195. 409 U.S. at 328-29.
196. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
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held in a "representative" rather than a "personal" capacity,' 7 even
though disclosure might incriminate the partner personally. Thus,
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination apparently is
inapplicable if disclosure is sought from an independent, well-
organized entity, as opposed to its individual members, and if the
summoned individual holds the records in a custodial capacity with
no right to independent control over their contents.'918
The Court's most recent discussion of fifth amendment challenges
to tax summonses appears in Fisher v. United States, "I which sug-
gests that the fifth amendment protects an individual only against
incrimination "by his own compelled testimonial communica-
tions."" ' In Fisher the taxpayer's attorney was summoned to pro-
duce records received from the taxpayer but prepared by the tax-
payer's accountant. Upholding the legality of the summons, the
Court stated that the production of records prepared by a third
party involves no compulsory testimony, either tacit or express, by
the taxpayer, and therefore the fifth amendment does not bar the
production of such documents even if the taxpayer is incriminated
as a result.
Although the Court in Fisher stated explicitly that it need not
decide whether fifth amendment claims would be equally unsuc-
cessful if asserted to protect from disclosure records prepared by the
summoned taxpayer's himself, the Court noted in dictum that
"[t]he taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena
merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required
to produce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or that
of someone else."2 ' By thus limiting the fifth amendment privilege,
the Court appears to have extended its statement in Couch that
survival of the tax system, predicated upon honest and voluntary
197. Id. at 87-91. Consistent with established precedent, the Court concluded that an
individual may not rely on a fifth amendment privilege to avoid producing the records of a
separate entity such as a corporation. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911)
(no fifth amendment protection for officer-recordholder of corporation). See also United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (officer of unincorporated labor union could not assert
fifth amendment privilege against disclosure of union records).
198. 417 U.S. at 97-99. A different result may have been reached had the factual situation
involved a small family partnership not clearly distinct from its individual partners. Id. at
101.
199. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See notes 153-57 supra & accompanying text.
200. 425 U.S. at 409 (emphasis supplied).
201. Id. at 410 (emphasis supplied).
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disclosure by the taxpayer, may require a suspension of the right
against self-incrimination. 22 Nevertheless, a distinction exists be-
tween disclosures required for a tax return and those necessary to
aid in investigations of tax liability. The tax reporting requirement,
although necessitating the publication of certain private informa-
tion, is not in itself incriminating. In contrast, a compelled disclo-
sure for the purpose of verifying the original report may be incrimi-
nating if it reveals perjury in the information supplied on the return
and if the summoned taxpayer himself has maintained the records.
The issue, therefore, is whether the disclosures are of such a
testimonial character as to warrant fifth amendment protection.21 3
If the records in question have been kept voluntarily by the summo-
nee, then in light of the Supreme Court's abandonment of the "mere
evidence" rule,0 4 the mere act of producing the requested informa-
tion may be insufficiently testimonial to evoke constitutional pro-
tection.2 15 If the taxpayer is required by law to maintain the records,
however, a danger may exist of compelled self-incriminatory testi-
mony sufficient to implicate fifth amendment protection, even
though the compelled communication results from a two-part pro-
cess of mandatory record-keeping and disclosure.
CONCLUSION
A taxpayer ordered by the IRS to produce his records may chal-
lenge the summons on various grounds. If the summons is directed
to the taxpayer himself, he may insist that the IRS seek court en-
forcement of the summons, and thereby obtain an opportunity to
challenge in court the procedural or substantive validity of the sum-
mons. If the summons is issued to a third-party recordholder, the
202. In Couch the Court stated that "[petitioner seeks extensions of constitutional pro-
tections against self-incrimination in the very situation where obligations of disclosure exist
and under a system largely dependent upon honest self-reporting even to survive." 409 U.S.
at 335.
203. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
204. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The mere evidence rule operated to prevent
searches for evidence that would aid in a particular apprehension or conviction but was
neither contraband nor an instrumentality or fruit of the crime.
205. But see Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957), in which the Court stated
that the "act of producing books or records in response to a Subpoena duces tecum is itself a
representation that the documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena." How-
ever, because the content of the records, together with the original return, may be incriminat-
ing, the content, and not the production, must be testimonial in nature.
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taxpayer also may have the opportunity to contest its legality. With
few exceptions, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 mandates that the
taxpayer receive notice of the issuance of a summons to a third
party, permitting the former to stay compliance by the third party
and to intervene at the enforcement hearing. He may insist that
enforcement be denied unless certain procedures have been satis-
fied: the summons must have been issued for a proper investigatory
purpose, in good faith, and prior to a recommendation to the Justice
Department that the taxpayer be prosecuted criminally for the defi-
ciency under investigation.
Although the taxpayer may challenge the summons for various
procedural deficiencies, he bears the burden of proving noncompli-
ance with the requirements. Moreover, the courts have broad discre-
tion to limit his discovery privileges, a situation unlikely to be reme-
died by the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information
Act, which exempts from disclosure certain inter- or intra-office
memoranda and investigatory files.
The taxpayer's constitutional challenges also are restricted. To
gain enforcement, the Service need not show probable cause. Nor
does the taxpayer have a protected fourth amendment interest in
his records if they are in the possession of a third party for other
than custodial purposes. Assuming that the IRS has met the formal
prerequisites for a valid summons, the judiciary will find no unrea-
sonable search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
The taxpayer probably will be no more successful should he at-
tempt to interpose a fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Because of the self-reporting requirement of the tax
system, the courts have construed that constitutional mandate nar-
rowly in tax matters. Indeed, whether it applies to tax records at all
is unclear. At a minimum, however, the right against self-
incrimination should protect against compelled disclosure of records
kept by the taxpayer if the summons is directed to the taxpayer
for records that he is required to maintain.
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